The Cost of Managerial Myopia: Evidence from Earnings Guidance Cessation
Abstract
We examine the consequences of firms ceasing quarterly earnings guidance, a practice increasingly advocated by governance experts to reduce short-termism. Using a staggered adoption design, we find that guidance cessation leads to increased long-term investment, reduced earnings management, but also higher information asymmetry and bid-ask spreads. The net effect on firm value depends critically on the quality of alternative disclosure channels.
停止季度盈利指引的企业长期投资增加、盈余管理减少,但同时面临更高的信息不对称和买卖价差。对企业价值的净效应取决于替代性信息披露渠道的质量。
采用交错采纳设计(Staggered DID),利用企业停止季度盈利指引的时间差异识别因果效应,并通过分析师覆盖度和机构投资者持股等变量检验异质性。
减少短期业绩指引有助于缓解管理层短视行为,但需要配套的信息披露机制来维持市场信息效率。
论文信息
METADATA引用格式
CITATIONKraft, A., Schwartz, R., Weiss, I. (2025). The Cost of Managerial Myopia: Evidence from Earnings Guidance Cessation. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*.
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