Management公司治理 / Corporate GovernanceTop 5%

CEO Overconfidence and Strategic Risk-Taking: The Moderating Role of Board Independence

Johnson R., Park S., Williams T.Wharton School, University of PennsylvaniaAcademy of Management Journal(AMJ)2025-09

Abstract

Drawing on upper echelons theory and agency theory, we investigate how CEO overconfidence influences strategic risk-taking decisions and how board independence moderates this relationship. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms over 2005-2023, we find that overconfident CEOs pursue more aggressive acquisition strategies and R&D investments, but independent boards effectively constrain excessive risk-taking.

AI SUMMARY

GENERATED

核心观点Key Findings

过度自信的CEO倾向于采取更激进的并购策略和研发投资，但独立董事会能有效约束过度冒险行为。董事会独立性的调节效应在CEO任期较长和股权集中度较高时更为显著。

研究方法Methodology

基于高层梯队理论和代理理论，使用2005-2023年S&P 500公司面板数据，通过CEO期权行权行为构建过度自信代理变量，采用固定效应模型和调节效应分析。

主要结论Conclusions

公司治理机制在约束管理者行为偏差方面发挥关键作用。加强董事会独立性是平衡创新激励与风险控制的有效途径。

关键词 Keywords

CEO过度自信战略风险董事会独立性公司治理高层梯队理论

论文信息

METADATA

期刊Academy of Management Journal

期刊缩写AMJ

发表日期2025-09

学科管理学 (Management)

子领域公司治理 / Corporate Governance

机构Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

排名Top 5%

引用格式

CITATION

Johnson, R., Park, S., Williams, T. (2025). CEO Overconfidence and Strategic Risk-Taking: The Moderating Role of Board Independence. *Academy of Management Journal*.

CEO Overconfidence and Strategic Risk-Taking: The Moderating Role of Board Independence

Abstract

论文信息

引用格式

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